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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:41:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-339347</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339347</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-339347</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339347</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-56416</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-56416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2845-97v4-7wm3</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2845-97v4-7wm3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2845-97v4-7wm3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-56416 — Possible heap buffer overflow when validator canonicalizes RDATA that contains domain name</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-56416</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-56416</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-56416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3333 — unbound security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3333</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unbound is a validating, recursive, caching DNS resolver. It is designed to be fast and lean and incorporates modern features based on open standards. To help increase online privacy, Unbound supports DNS-over-TLS which allows clients to encrypt their communication. Unbound is available for most platforms such as FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, MacOS, Linux and Microsoft Windows. Unbound is a totally free, open source software under the BSD license. It doesn&amp;amp;amp;apos;t make custom builds or provide specific features to paying customers only.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, applications using libunbound and configured with &amp;amp;apos;unwanted-reply-threshold&amp;amp;apos;, could eventually be abruptly terminated if the threshold is reached and libunbound needs to call &amp;amp;apos;libworker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; since the function is absent from the function call allow list. When an application using libunbound sets &amp;amp;apos;unwanted-reply-threshold&amp;amp;apos; to any non-zero value and the iterator queries an authoritative that replies with enough wrong-transaction-ID UDP datagrams to cross the threshold, the &amp;amp;apos;libworker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; will eventually be called. Since the function is absent from the function call allow list, this leads to a fatal exit of libunbound and eventual termination of the embedding application.Unbound itself is not affected since its relevant function &amp;amp;apos;worker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; is registed in the allow list and proceeds to…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unbound is a validating, recursive, caching DNS resolver. It is designed to be fast and lean and incorporates modern features based on open standards. To help increase online privacy, Unbound supports DNS-over-TLS which allows clients to encrypt their communication. Unbound is available for most platforms such as FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, MacOS, Linux and Microsoft Windows. Unbound is a totally free, open source software under the BSD license. It doesn&amp;amp;amp;apos;t make custom builds or provide specific features to paying customers only.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, applications using libunbound and configured with &amp;amp;apos;unwanted-reply-threshold&amp;amp;apos;, could eventually be abruptly terminated if the threshold is reached and libunbound needs to call &amp;amp;apos;libworker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; since the function is absent from the function call allow list. When an application using libunbound sets &amp;amp;apos;unwanted-reply-threshold&amp;amp;apos; to any non-zero value and the iterator queries an authoritative that replies with enough wrong-transaction-ID UDP datagrams to cross the threshold, the &amp;amp;apos;libworker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; will eventually be called. Since the function is absent from the function call allow list, this leads to a fatal exit of libunbound and eventual termination of the embedding application.Unbound itself is not affected since its relevant function &amp;amp;apos;worker_alloc_cleanup&amp;amp;apos; is registed in the allow list and proceeds to…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3333</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11380-1 — libunbound8-1.25.2-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11380-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libunbound8-1.25.2-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libunbound8-1.25.2-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11380-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:43588 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:43588</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via assertion failure in DNS-over-QUIC environments unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via improper validation of DNS-over-QUIC client length unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNSCrypt query unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via terminated DNS-over-QUIC queries unbound: Unbound: DNS cache integrity issue unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service due to &amp;#39;harden-below-nxdomain&amp;#39; logic bypass unbound: Unbound: Cache poisoning via insufficient RRSIG.Labels validation and premature cache writes unbound: Unbound: Information disclosure via DNSSEC wildcard replay unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via DNSSEC query amplification bypass unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service due to freed pointer dereference in DNS-over-TLS handling unbound: Unbound: Insecure DNS redirection via spoofed DNS answers unbound: Unbound: DNS response policy replacement via hostname spoofing unbound: NLnet Labs Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNS glue records unbound: Unbound: DNS cache poisoning via UDP source port predictability unbound: Unbound: Denial of service due to memory corruption under specific configurations. unbound: Unbound: DNS Cookie security bypass via incorrect server cookie calculation unbound: Unbound: Information disclosure due to local policy bypass via unbound-control unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNS responses with expired records unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via malformed EDNS Report-Channel option unbound:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via assertion failure in DNS-over-QUIC environments unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via improper validation of DNS-over-QUIC client length unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNSCrypt query unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via terminated DNS-over-QUIC queries unbound: Unbound: DNS cache integrity issue unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service due to &amp;#39;harden-below-nxdomain&amp;#39; logic bypass unbound: Unbound: Cache poisoning via insufficient RRSIG.Labels validation and premature cache writes unbound: Unbound: Information disclosure via DNSSEC wildcard replay unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via DNSSEC query amplification bypass unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service due to freed pointer dereference in DNS-over-TLS handling unbound: Unbound: Insecure DNS redirection via spoofed DNS answers unbound: Unbound: DNS response policy replacement via hostname spoofing unbound: NLnet Labs Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNS glue records unbound: Unbound: DNS cache poisoning via UDP source port predictability unbound: Unbound: Denial of service due to memory corruption under specific configurations. unbound: Unbound: DNS Cookie security bypass via incorrect server cookie calculation unbound: Unbound: Information disclosure due to local policy bypass via unbound-control unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via crafted DNS responses with expired records unbound: Unbound: Denial of Service via malformed EDNS Report-Channel option unbound:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:43588</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23050-1 — Security update for unbound</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23050-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for unbound&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for unbound&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23050-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-56416</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-56416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: unbound, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-56416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2492 — Unbound: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2492</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Unbound ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Daten zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Unbound ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Daten zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2492</guid>
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