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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:20:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330356</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330356</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330356</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330356</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55961</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55961</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55961</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cj56-5c53-9qjf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cj56-5c53-9qjf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cj56-5c53-9qjf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-55961 — wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() reports success for degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 with no signer</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-55961</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-55961</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-55961</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-55961</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-55961</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-55961</guid>
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