<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 13:57:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330005</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330005</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330005</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330005</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-55488</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55488</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called &amp;#34;motion,&amp;#34; which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called &amp;#34;motion,&amp;#34; which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55488</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh — motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rw9q-97r9-8gvh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
    target_dir = camera_config.get(&amp;#39;target_dir&amp;#39;)
    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
    return full_path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python&amp;#39;s `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado&amp;#39;s StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
    return path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
    return absolute_path
```
T…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
    target_dir = camera_config.get(&amp;#39;target_dir&amp;#39;)
    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
    return full_path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python&amp;#39;s `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado&amp;#39;s StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
    return path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
    return absolute_path
```
T…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rw9q-97r9-8gvh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2667 — motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2667</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
    target_dir = camera_config.get(&amp;#39;target_dir&amp;#39;)
    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
    return full_path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python&amp;#39;s `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado&amp;#39;s StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
    return path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
    return absolute_path
```
T…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado&amp;#39;s built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
    target_dir = camera_config.get(&amp;#39;target_dir&amp;#39;)
    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
    return full_path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python&amp;#39;s `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado&amp;#39;s StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
    return path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
    return absolute_path
```
T…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2667</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
