<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 16:26:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368281</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368281</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368281</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368281</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54447</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54447</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54447</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc — garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjhr-76vg-2hvc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: garminconnect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Severity:** High
- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;lt;= 0.3.4`
- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def dump(self, path: str) -&amp;gt; None:
    p = Path(path).expanduser()
    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(&amp;#34;.json&amp;#34;):
        p = p / &amp;#34;garmin_tokens.json&amp;#34;
    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=
    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- token directory → `0o755`
- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A separate, un…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: garminconnect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Severity:** High
- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;lt;= 0.3.4`
- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def dump(self, path: str) -&amp;gt; None:
    p = Path(path).expanduser()
    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(&amp;#34;.json&amp;#34;):
        p = p / &amp;#34;garmin_tokens.json&amp;#34;
    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=
    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- token directory → `0o755`
- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A separate, un…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wjhr-76vg-2hvc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3467 — garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3467</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: garminconnect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Severity:** High
- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;lt;= 0.3.4`
- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def dump(self, path: str) -&amp;gt; None:
    p = Path(path).expanduser()
    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(&amp;#34;.json&amp;#34;):
        p = p / &amp;#34;garmin_tokens.json&amp;#34;
    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=
    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- token directory → `0o755`
- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A separate, un…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: garminconnect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim&amp;#39;s Garmin Connect account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Severity:** High
- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)
- **Affected versions:** `&amp;lt;= 0.3.4`
- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def dump(self, path: str) -&amp;gt; None:
    p = Path(path).expanduser()
    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(&amp;#34;.json&amp;#34;):
        p = p / &amp;#34;garmin_tokens.json&amp;#34;
    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=
    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- token directory → `0o755`
- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A separate, un…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3467</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
