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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:23:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329844</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329844</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329844</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329844</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54015</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54015</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). This affects /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff, /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version, and /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}. An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). This affects /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff, /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version, and /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}. An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54015</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj — Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt&amp;#39;s history snapshots (read).
- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt&amp;#39;s snapshot into the caller&amp;#39;s prompt, exposing its content (read).
- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt&amp;#39;s history entry (delete).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user&amp;#39;s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user&amp;#39;s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt&amp;#39;s history snapshots (read).
- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt&amp;#39;s snapshot into the caller&amp;#39;s prompt, exposing its content (read).
- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt&amp;#39;s history entry (delete).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user&amp;#39;s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user&amp;#39;s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2701 — Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2701</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt&amp;#39;s history snapshots (read).
- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt&amp;#39;s snapshot into the caller&amp;#39;s prompt, exposing its content (read).
- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt&amp;#39;s history entry (delete).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user&amp;#39;s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user&amp;#39;s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` — returns another prompt&amp;#39;s history snapshots (read).
- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` — restores another prompt&amp;#39;s snapshot into the caller&amp;#39;s prompt, exposing its content (read).
- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` — deletes another prompt&amp;#39;s history entry (delete).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user&amp;#39;s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user&amp;#39;s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user&amp;#39;s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2701</guid>
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