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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:42:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329845</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329845</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329845</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329845</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54009</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54009</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, POST /api/chat/completions accepts an image_url.url value that, when it does NOT start with http://, https://, or data:image/, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. an authenticated user can therefore set image_url.url to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. the user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, POST /api/chat/completions accepts an image_url.url value that, when it does NOT start with http://, https://, or data:image/, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. an authenticated user can therefore set image_url.url to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. the user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54009</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wch8-mhj5-9frg — Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wch8-mhj5-9frg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get(&amp;#39;messages&amp;#39;, [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get(&amp;#39;content&amp;#39;)
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;) != &amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;:
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get(&amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;, {}).get(&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
            if image_url.startswith(&amp;#39;data:image/&amp;#39;):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get(&amp;#39;messages&amp;#39;, [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get(&amp;#39;content&amp;#39;)
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;) != &amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;:
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get(&amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;, {}).get(&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
            if image_url.startswith(&amp;#39;data:image/&amp;#39;):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wch8-mhj5-9frg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2766 — Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2766</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get(&amp;#39;messages&amp;#39;, [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get(&amp;#39;content&amp;#39;)
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;) != &amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;:
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get(&amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;, {}).get(&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
            if image_url.startswith(&amp;#39;data:image/&amp;#39;):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user&amp;#39;s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get(&amp;#39;messages&amp;#39;, [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get(&amp;#39;content&amp;#39;)
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;) != &amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;:
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get(&amp;#39;image_url&amp;#39;, {}).get(&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
            if image_url.startswith(&amp;#39;data:image/&amp;#39;):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2766</guid>
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