https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 03:41:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-53832 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.</p> <p>This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw&#39;s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator&#39;s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.</p> <p>### Patched Versions</p> <p>The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.</p> <p>This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw&#39;s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator&#39;s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.</p> <p>### Patched Versions</p> <p>The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-53832 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327425 EUVD-2026-327425 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327425 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53832 <p>OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53832 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rggc-m335-3wvj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.</p> <p>This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw&#39;s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator&#39;s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.</p> <p>### Patched Versions</p> <p>The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.</p> <p>This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw&#39;s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator&#39;s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.</p> <p>### Patched Versions</p> <p>The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.</p> <p>### Mitigations</p> <p>bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rggc-m335-3wvj https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1738 <p>Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, erhöhte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Informationen offenzulegen, Konfigurationen zu manipulieren, beliebige Befehle oder Code auszuführen sowie interne Systeme über SSRF anzugreifen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, erhöhte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Informationen offenzulegen, Konfigurationen zu manipulieren, beliebige Befehle oder Code auszuführen sowie interne Systeme über SSRF anzugreifen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1738