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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 18:14:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329683</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329683</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329683</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329683</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53753</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53753</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM friendly web crawler &amp;amp; scraper. Prior to 0.8.7, the _safe_eval_expression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (gi_frame, f_back, f_builtins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution. The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via POST /crawl with a crafted extraction schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM friendly web crawler &amp;amp; scraper. Prior to 0.8.7, the _safe_eval_expression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (gi_frame, f_back, f_builtins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution. The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via POST /crawl with a crafted extraction schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53753</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7 — Crawl4AI: AST Sandbox Escape via gi_frame.f_back Chain - Pre-Auth RCE in Docker API</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qxjp-w3pj-48m7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Vector&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:
1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame`
2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back`
3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__`
4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value
2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS` (dead security-sensitive code)
3. `function` key with Python callables still works for SDK users
4. Replaced `eval()` in `/config/dump` with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic
5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped `__builtins__`, `__loader__`, `__spec__` from injected modules; remove…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Vector&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:
1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame`
2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back`
3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__`
4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value
2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS` (dead security-sensitive code)
3. `function` key with Python callables still works for SDK users
4. Replaced `eval()` in `/config/dump` with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic
5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped `__builtins__`, `__loader__`, `__spec__` from injected modules; remove…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qxjp-w3pj-48m7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-319 — Crawl4AI: AST Sandbox Escape via gi_frame.f_back Chain - Pre-Auth RCE in Docker API</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-319</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Vector&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:
1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame`
2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back`
3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__`
4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands
 
### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value
2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS` (dead security-sensitive code)
3. `function` key with Python callables still works for SDK users
4. Replaced `eval()` in `/config/dump` with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic
5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped `__builtins__`, `__loader__`, `__spec__` from injected modules; remov…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Vector&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:
1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame`
2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back`
3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__`
4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands
 
### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value
2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS` (dead security-sensitive code)
3. `function` key with Python callables still works for SDK users
4. Replaced `eval()` in `/config/dump` with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic
5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped `__builtins__`, `__loader__`, `__spec__` from injected modules; remov…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-319</guid>
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