https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:34:52 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-13911 bdu:2026-13911 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-13911 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-52940 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-52940 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162 certfr-2026-avi-1162 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329742 EUVD-2026-329742 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329742 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52940 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()</p> <p>tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage.</p> <p>An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.</p> <p>Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()</p> <p>tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage.</p> <p>An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.</p> <p>Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52940 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mf5-pgq8-jhcp <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()</p> <p>tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage.</p> <p>An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.</p> <p>Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()</p> <p>tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage.</p> <p>An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.</p> <p>Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mf5-pgq8-jhcp https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52940 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 128 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user() tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage. An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet. Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 128 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user() tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage. An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet. Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52940 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2056 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2056