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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 04:28:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-13903</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-13903</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-13903</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-13903</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-52927</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-52927</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-52927</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0812 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Microsoft Azure Linux. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoque…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0812</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0812</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0812</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-348096</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348096</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-348096</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52927</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52927</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Luxiao Xu says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from
 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks
 proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation
 logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected
 size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension
 requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large
 as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,
 and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though
match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the
user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the
start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total
size copied from userspace).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes,
so they need this extra check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Luxiao Xu says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from
 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks
 proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation
 logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected
 size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension
 requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large
 as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,
 and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though
match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the
user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the
start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total
size copied from userspace).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes,
so they need this extra check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52927</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c6h6-mmcc-x4qj</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c6h6-mmcc-x4qj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Luxiao Xu says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from
 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks
 proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation
 logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected
 size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension
 requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large
 as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,
 and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though
match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the
user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the
start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total
size copied from userspace).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes,
so they need this extra check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Luxiao Xu says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from
 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks
 proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation
 logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected
 size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension
 requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large
 as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,
 and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though
match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the
user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the
start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total
size copied from userspace).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes,
so they need this extra check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c6h6-mmcc-x4qj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-52927 — netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-52927</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-52927</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-52927</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3206 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3206</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 &amp;amp;amp; V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 &amp;amp;amp; X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE &amp;amp;amp; A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 &amp;amp;amp; A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.(CVE-2025-10263)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet: RAW sockets using IPPROTO_RAW MUST drop incoming ICMP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yizhou Zhao reported that simply having one RAW socket on protocol
IPPROTO_RAW (255) was dangerous.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, 255);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious incoming ICMP packet can set the protocol field to 255
and match this socket, leading to FNHE cache changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inner = IP(src=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.2.1&amp;amp;quot;, dst=&amp;amp;quot;8.8.8.8&amp;amp;quot;, proto=255)/Raw(&amp;amp;quot;TEST&amp;amp;quot;)
pkt = IP(src=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.1.1&amp;amp;quot;, dst=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.2.1&amp;amp;quot;)/ICMP(type=3, code=4, nexthopmtu=576)/inner&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;amp;quot;man 7 raw&amp;amp;quot; states:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A protocol of IPPROTO_RAW implies enabled IP_HDRINCL and is able
  to send any IP protocol that is specified in the passed header.
  Receiving of all IP protocols via IPPROTO_RAW is not possible
  using raw sockets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure we drop these malicious packets.(CVE-2026-46266)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tun: free page on build_skb failure in tun_xdp_one()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When build_skb() fails in tun_xdp_one(), the function sets ret to
-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 &amp;amp;amp; V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 &amp;amp;amp; X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE &amp;amp;amp; A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 &amp;amp;amp; A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.(CVE-2025-10263)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet: RAW sockets using IPPROTO_RAW MUST drop incoming ICMP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yizhou Zhao reported that simply having one RAW socket on protocol
IPPROTO_RAW (255) was dangerous.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, 255);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious incoming ICMP packet can set the protocol field to 255
and match this socket, leading to FNHE cache changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inner = IP(src=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.2.1&amp;amp;quot;, dst=&amp;amp;quot;8.8.8.8&amp;amp;quot;, proto=255)/Raw(&amp;amp;quot;TEST&amp;amp;quot;)
pkt = IP(src=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.1.1&amp;amp;quot;, dst=&amp;amp;quot;192.168.2.1&amp;amp;quot;)/ICMP(type=3, code=4, nexthopmtu=576)/inner&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;amp;quot;man 7 raw&amp;amp;quot; states:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A protocol of IPPROTO_RAW implies enabled IP_HDRINCL and is able
  to send any IP protocol that is specified in the passed header.
  Receiving of all IP protocols via IPPROTO_RAW is not possible
  using raw sockets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Make sure we drop these malicious packets.(CVE-2026-46266)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tun: free page on build_skb failure in tun_xdp_one()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When build_skb() fails in tun_xdp_one(), the function sets ret to
-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3206</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21555-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23066-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-52927</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52927</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 254 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says:  The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from  32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks  proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.  When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation  logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected  size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension  requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.  This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large  as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,  and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 254 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says:  The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from  32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks  proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.  When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation  logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension&amp;#39;s expected  size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension  requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.  This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large  as the extension&amp;#39;s required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,  and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match-&amp;gt;compat_from_user() call.  Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The -&amp;gt;compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52927</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2056 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2056</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff  auszulösen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff  auszulösen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2056</guid>
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