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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 12:59:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-QE63753 — Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-qe63753</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the caddy package. Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the caddy package. Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-qe63753</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329703</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329703</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329703</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329703</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52844</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52844</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.4, on Windows, Caddy path matchers treat /private\secret.txt as outside /private/*, but file_server later resolves the same request path as private\secret.txt on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting /private/*. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.4, on Windows, Caddy path matchers treat /private\secret.txt as outside /private/*, but file_server later resolves the same request path as private\secret.txt on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting /private/*. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52844</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6 — Caddy: Windows `file_server` path authorization bypass via encoded backslash</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2, Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Windows, Caddy `path` matchers treat `/private\secret.txt` as outside `/private/*`, but `file_server` later resolves the same request path as `private\secret.txt` on disk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated remote client can request `/private%5csecret.txt` and bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting `/private/*`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mismatch is between two Caddy code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `MatchPath.MatchWithError()` compares `r.URL.Path` using URL path semantics and does not normalize `\` to `/`: `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go:429`, `:436`, `:490`, `:532`.
- If the route matcher misses, Caddy skips that route: `modules/caddyhttp/routes.go:271`.
- `file_server` then maps the same request path to a filesystem path with `SanitizedPathJoin(root, r.URL.Path)`: `modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:294`, `modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go:257`, `:263`.
- On Windows, Go filesystem path handling treats `\` as a separator, so the default filesystem opens the file under the protected directory: `internal/filesystems/os.go:18`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is related to, but distinct from, `GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4 / CVE-2026-27585`. That advisory fixed backslash handling in the `file` matcher / `try_files` glob path. This report does not use `try_files` or the `file` matcher; it affects ordinary `path` route matchers in front of direct `file_server` serving and reproduces on current HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tested on current HEAD `6c675e29f87cbe7326983ddb6d739175119d394c` with a Windows `caddy.exe` built from this r…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2, Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Windows, Caddy `path` matchers treat `/private\secret.txt` as outside `/private/*`, but `file_server` later resolves the same request path as `private\secret.txt` on disk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated remote client can request `/private%5csecret.txt` and bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting `/private/*`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mismatch is between two Caddy code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `MatchPath.MatchWithError()` compares `r.URL.Path` using URL path semantics and does not normalize `\` to `/`: `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go:429`, `:436`, `:490`, `:532`.
- If the route matcher misses, Caddy skips that route: `modules/caddyhttp/routes.go:271`.
- `file_server` then maps the same request path to a filesystem path with `SanitizedPathJoin(root, r.URL.Path)`: `modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:294`, `modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go:257`, `:263`.
- On Windows, Go filesystem path handling treats `\` as a separator, so the default filesystem opens the file under the protected directory: `internal/filesystems/os.go:18`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is related to, but distinct from, `GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4 / CVE-2026-27585`. That advisory fixed backslash handling in the `file` matcher / `try_files` glob path. This report does not use `try_files` or the `file` matcher; it affects ordinary `path` route matchers in front of direct `file_server` serving and reproduces on current HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tested on current HEAD `6c675e29f87cbe7326983ddb6d739175119d394c` with a Windows `caddy.exe` built from this r…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qrp7-cvwr-j2c6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-52844</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52844</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.4, on Windows, Caddy path matchers treat /private\secret.txt as outside /private/*, but file_server later resolves the same request path as private\secret.txt on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting /private/*. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.4, on Windows, Caddy path matchers treat /private\secret.txt as outside /private/*, but file_server later resolves the same request path as private\secret.txt on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting /private/*. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-52844</guid>
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