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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 07:41:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330459</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330459</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330459</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330459</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-52811</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, (*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component — UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or &amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, (*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component — UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or &amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-52811</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m — Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-89mr-xqfv-758m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: gogs.io/gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `&amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks).
Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)
if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) {                       // ← LEAF-ONLY
    return errors.Newf(&amp;#34;cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s&amp;#34;, upload.Name)
}
if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vs. `UpdateRepoFile`&amp;#39;s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
if hasSymlinkInPath(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: gogs.io/gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `&amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks).
Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)
if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) {                       // ← LEAF-ONLY
    return errors.Newf(&amp;#34;cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s&amp;#34;, upload.Name)
}
if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vs. `UpdateRepoFile`&amp;#39;s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
if hasSymlinkInPath(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-89mr-xqfv-758m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2013 — Gogs: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2013</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen – sogar mit erweiterten Berechtigungen, was zur vollständigen Kontrolle über das System führen kann –, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Benutzer auf bösartige Websites umzuleiten oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen – sogar mit erweiterten Berechtigungen, was zur vollständigen Kontrolle über das System führen kann –, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Benutzer auf bösartige Websites umzuleiten oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2013</guid>
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