https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 19:32:46 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15487 bdu:2026-15487 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15487 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1032 certfr-2026-avi-1032 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1032 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326970 EUVD-2026-326970 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326970 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50560 <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50560 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”</p> <p>When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:</p> <p>- Read the request - Proxy the request to the origin - Attempt to produce a response - Create an exception while writing the headers for the response</p> <p>Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.</p> <p>## Remediation</p> <p>When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.</p> <p>## Credit Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)</p> <p>## Contact Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”</p> <p>When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:</p> <p>- Read the request - Proxy the request to the origin - Attempt to produce a response - Create an exception while writing the headers for the response</p> <p>Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.</p> <p>## Remediation</p> <p>When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.</p> <p>## Credit Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)</p> <p>## Contact Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-50560 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-50560 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814