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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:32:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-336190</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336190</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-336190</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336190</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-50181</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50181</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50181</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fg23-3346-88f5 — Langroid: Path traversal in the file tools allows read/write outside configured current directory</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg23-3346-88f5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langroid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `langroid/agent/tools/file_tools.py`
- `langroid/utils/system.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant behavior observed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ReadFileTool` contains a comment indicating the intended assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
# ASSUME: file_path should be relative to the curr_dir&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool then changes into the configured current directory and calls read_file(self.file_path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WriteFileTool similarly resolves curr_dir, changes into that directory, and calls create_file(self.file_path, self.content).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that changing the process working directory does not prevent traversal. A path such as ../secret.txt is still valid and resolves outside the configured curr_dir.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In local testing, ReadFileTool su…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langroid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `langroid/agent/tools/file_tools.py`
- `langroid/utils/system.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant behavior observed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ReadFileTool` contains a comment indicating the intended assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
# ASSUME: file_path should be relative to the curr_dir&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool then changes into the configured current directory and calls read_file(self.file_path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WriteFileTool similarly resolves curr_dir, changes into that directory, and calls create_file(self.file_path, self.content).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that changing the process working directory does not prevent traversal. A path such as ../secret.txt is still valid and resolves outside the configured curr_dir.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In local testing, ReadFileTool su…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg23-3346-88f5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2578 — Langroid: Path traversal in the file tools allows read/write outside configured current directory</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2578</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langroid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `langroid/agent/tools/file_tools.py`
- `langroid/utils/system.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant behavior observed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ReadFileTool` contains a comment indicating the intended assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
# ASSUME: file_path should be relative to the curr_dir&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool then changes into the configured current directory and calls read_file(self.file_path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WriteFileTool similarly resolves curr_dir, changes into that directory, and calls create_file(self.file_path, self.content).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that changing the process working directory does not prevent traversal. A path such as ../secret.txt is still valid and resolves outside the configured curr_dir.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In local testing, ReadFileTool su…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langroid&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Langroid&amp;#39;s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `langroid/agent/tools/file_tools.py`
- `langroid/utils/system.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant behavior observed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ReadFileTool` contains a comment indicating the intended assumption:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
# ASSUME: file_path should be relative to the curr_dir&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool then changes into the configured current directory and calls read_file(self.file_path).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WriteFileTool similarly resolves curr_dir, changes into that directory, and calls create_file(self.file_path, self.content).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is that changing the process working directory does not prevent traversal. A path such as ../secret.txt is still valid and resolves outside the configured curr_dir.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In local testing, ReadFileTool su…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2578</guid>
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