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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 14:17:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0986 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits IBM. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un attaquan…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0986</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0986</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0986</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-AQ98798 — Security fixes for CVE-2026-25680, CVE-2026-25681, CVE-2026-27136, CVE-2026-33811, CVE-2026-33814, CVE-2026-39817, CVE-…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-aq98798</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: tigera-operator&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the tigera-operator package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: tigera-operator&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the tigera-operator package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-aq98798</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338993</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338993</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338993</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338993</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-50162</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50162</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -&amp;gt; /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -&amp;gt; /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50162</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv — oras-go has file store write outside workingDir via symlink traversal</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file content store in `oras-go` attempts to confine writes to `workingDir` when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If `workingDir` contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) targets a path under that symlink, `pushFile()` can create a file outside `workingDir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## relevant links&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- repository: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go
- commit: 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1
- callsite: content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` (used by `pushFile()`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## vulnerability details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**pins:** oras-project/oras-go@03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**as-of:** 2026-02-17&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**policy:** GitHub Security Advisory (oras-project/oras-go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**callsite:** content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` → `pushFile()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**attacker control:** Attacker controls the pushed name (`ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) and can select a path with a symlink path component under `workingDir` → `resolveWritePath()` blocks `..` via `filepath.Rel` but does not prevent symlink traversal → `pushFile()` opens/creates the final path and follows the symlink → a file is created outside `workingDir`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`resolveWritePath()` enforces the write boundary using a `filepath.Rel`-style check against `workingDir`. This prevents `../` escapes but is purely lexical and does not resolve symlinks. If a path component under `workingDir` is a symlink to an external location,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file content store in `oras-go` attempts to confine writes to `workingDir` when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If `workingDir` contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) targets a path under that symlink, `pushFile()` can create a file outside `workingDir`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## relevant links&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- repository: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go
- commit: 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1
- callsite: content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` (used by `pushFile()`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## vulnerability details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**pins:** oras-project/oras-go@03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**as-of:** 2026-02-17&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**policy:** GitHub Security Advisory (oras-project/oras-go)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**callsite:** content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` → `pushFile()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**attacker control:** Attacker controls the pushed name (`ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) and can select a path with a symlink path component under `workingDir` → `resolveWritePath()` blocks `..` via `filepath.Rel` but does not prevent symlink traversal → `pushFile()` opens/creates the final path and follows the symlink → a file is created outside `workingDir`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`resolveWritePath()` enforces the write boundary using a `filepath.Rel`-style check against `workingDir`. This prevents `../` escapes but is purely lexical and does not resolve symlinks. If a path component under `workingDir` is a symlink to an external location,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:42230 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:42230</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;oras-go: oras-go: File store write outside working directory via symlink traversal golang.org/x/text: golang.org/x/text: Denial of Service via invalid UTF-8 input Helm: Helm: Denial of Service via malformed chart files&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;oras-go: oras-go: File store write outside working directory via symlink traversal golang.org/x/text: golang.org/x/text: Denial of Service via invalid UTF-8 input Helm: Helm: Denial of Service via malformed chart files&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:42230</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-50162</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-50162</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-oras-oras-go, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-oras-oras-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -&amp;gt; /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: golang-oras-oras-go, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: golang-oras-oras-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -&amp;gt; /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-50162</guid>
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