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EUVD-2026-356477

fkie_cve-2026-49283

The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. Prior to versions 4.19.3, 4.20.2, 5.0.6, and 6.2.1, the HTTPArtifact::receive() flow can treat an unsigned embedded SAML Response as cryptographically valid for the wrong identity provider. SOAPClient::addSSLValidator() attaches a TLS-based validator to the outer SOAP ArtifactResponse, while the embedded Response receives a validator that delegates to the outer message and is later checked against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer rather than necessarily the artifact issuer. SOAPClient::validateSSL() returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key being validated, and SAML2\Message::validate() treats a validator call that does not throw as successful. In a multi-IdP federation, a malicious or lower-trust IdP can therefore provide an ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a higher-trust victim IdP as issuer and authenticate as arbitrary users with attacker-chosen assertion attributes, NameID, and session data. This issue is fixed in versions 4.19.3, 4.20.2, 5.0.6, and 6.2.1.

GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx — SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass

Affected: Packagist: simplesamlphp/saml2, Packagist: simplesamlphp/saml2-legacy

## Summary

SimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP.

In the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer.

The critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP.

In a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP.

## Impact

A malicious or lower-trust IdP in the same SP/federation trust set can authenticate to the SP as users from another IdP when HTTP-Artifact is used. The attacker can choose assertion attributes, `NameID`, and session data in the forged unsigned assertion.

This is an authentication bypass and identity-pr…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-49283

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: simplesamlphp