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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:19:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-ansible-CVE-2026-49272 — OAuthLib: Bearer token can be retrieved as long as client knows a valid client ID for device workflow</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible-cve-2026-49272</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A call to the token endpoint with a grant type of `&amp;#34;urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&amp;#34;` and a bogus `device_code` is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-3.4) says that the token endpoint should take in `device_code` as a required parameter.`DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does not perform any validation of `device_code`. `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` should be validating that `device_code` was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how `AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does the checks [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L446) and [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L483).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I would like to propose a new method be added to `RequestValidator` called `validate_device_code` that is similar to the `validate_code` method and is called inside of `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Create an implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` that returns `True` if the client&amp;#39;s `client_type` is `&amp;#34;public&amp;#34;`. You would find yourself in this scenario because there&amp;#39;s another issue with `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A call to the token endpoint with a grant type of `&amp;#34;urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&amp;#34;` and a bogus `device_code` is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-3.4) says that the token endpoint should take in `device_code` as a required parameter.`DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does not perform any validation of `device_code`. `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` should be validating that `device_code` was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how `AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does the checks [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L446) and [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L483).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I would like to propose a new method be added to `RequestValidator` called `validate_device_code` that is similar to the `validate_code` method and is called inside of `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Create an implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` that returns `True` if the client&amp;#39;s `client_type` is `&amp;#34;public&amp;#34;`. You would find yourself in this scenario because there&amp;#39;s another issue with `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible-cve-2026-49272</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-SV89571 — Security fix for CVE-2026-49272 applied in: litellm-database 1.97.1-r1</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-sv89571</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: litellm-database&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the litellm-database package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: litellm-database&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the litellm-database package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-sv89571</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-400903</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400903</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-400903</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400903</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49272</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49272</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.3.0 until 4.0.1, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RFC 8628 device workflow does not require DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request to check that the device_code parameter is present and valid. A caller whose client request is accepted by the configured validator and who knows a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow can submit a missing or bogus device code to the token endpoint and obtain a bearer token without completing device authorization. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.3.0 until 4.0.1, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RFC 8628 device workflow does not require DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request to check that the device_code parameter is present and valid. A caller whose client request is accepted by the configured validator and who knows a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow can submit a missing or bogus device code to the token endpoint and obtain a bearer token without completing device authorization. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49272</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3jp2-3mrg-2vxc — OAuthLib: Bearer token can be retrieved as long as client knows a valid client ID for device workflow</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3jp2-3mrg-2vxc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A call to the token endpoint with a grant type of `&amp;#34;urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&amp;#34;` and a bogus `device_code` is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-3.4) says that the token endpoint should take in `device_code` as a required parameter.`DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does not perform any validation of `device_code`. `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` should be validating that `device_code` was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how `AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does the checks [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L446) and [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L483).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I would like to propose a new method be added to `RequestValidator` called `validate_device_code` that is similar to the `validate_code` method and is called inside of `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Create an implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` that returns `True` if the client&amp;#39;s `client_type` is `&amp;#34;public&amp;#34;`. You would find yourself in this scenario because there&amp;#39;s another issue with `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A call to the token endpoint with a grant type of `&amp;#34;urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&amp;#34;` and a bogus `device_code` is able to get a bearer token as long as they know a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[Section 3.4 of the RFC 8628 spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-3.4) says that the token endpoint should take in `device_code` as a required parameter.`DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does not perform any validation of `device_code`. `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request` should be validating that `device_code` was passed in as a parameter and that it is valid, similar to how `AuthorizationCodeGrant.validate_token_request` does the checks [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L446) and [here](https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/a015b446622f2b925517501fe484c10eff7a83c0/oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py#L483).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I would like to propose a new method be added to `RequestValidator` called `validate_device_code` that is similar to the `validate_code` method and is called inside of `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Create an implementation of `RequestValidation.authenticate_client` that returns `True` if the client&amp;#39;s `client_type` is `&amp;#34;public&amp;#34;`. You would find yourself in this scenario because there&amp;#39;s another issue with `DeviceCodeGrant.validate_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3jp2-3mrg-2vxc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:99787 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.4.7 (CUDA)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:99787</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing setuptools: Path Traversal Vulnerability in setuptools PackageIndex curl: curl: Insecure connection establishment due to TLS configuration mismatch curl: libcurl: Unauthorized connection reuse due to a logical error curl: Information disclosure due to uncleared proxy authentication state curl: curl: Man-in-the-middle attack via SSH host key bypass oauthlib: oauthlib: Authentication bypass via missing device code validation pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via infinite loop during crafted MIC image parsing pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via unbounded recursion in PDF parser pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via zero-size images in rank filters pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds memory access on zero-width images pillow: pillow: Denial of service via crafted APNG image pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from crafted GIF image pillow: pillow: Denial of service via double free during image transformation pill…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing setuptools: Path Traversal Vulnerability in setuptools PackageIndex curl: curl: Insecure connection establishment due to TLS configuration mismatch curl: libcurl: Unauthorized connection reuse due to a logical error curl: Information disclosure due to uncleared proxy authentication state curl: curl: Man-in-the-middle attack via SSH host key bypass oauthlib: oauthlib: Authentication bypass via missing device code validation pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via infinite loop during crafted MIC image parsing pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via unbounded recursion in PDF parser pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via zero-size images in rank filters pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds memory access on zero-width images pillow: pillow: Denial of service via crafted APNG image pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from crafted GIF image pillow: pillow: Denial of service via double free during image transformation pill…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:99787</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-49272</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49272</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.10: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.3.0 until 4.0.1, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RFC 8628 device workflow does not require DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request to check that the device_code parameter is present and valid. A caller whose client request is accepted by the configured validator and who knows a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow can submit a missing or bogus device code to the token endpoint and obtain a bearer token without completing device authorization. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.10: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.3.0 until 4.0.1, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RFC 8628 device workflow does not require DeviceCodeGrant.validate_token_request to check that the device_code parameter is present and valid. A caller whose client request is accepted by the configured validator and who knows a valid client ID enabled for the device workflow can submit a missing or bogus device code to the token endpoint and obtain a bearer token without completing device authorization. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49272</guid>
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