https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:29:51 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10240 bdu:2026-10240 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10240 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-am39668 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: apache-nifi</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the apache-nifi package. yawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: apache-nifi</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the apache-nifi package. yawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-am39668 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333592 EUVD-2026-333592 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333592 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49099 <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.</p> <p>The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id…</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.</p> <p>The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49099 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcc7-c8mp-34qx <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.</p> <p>The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&#39;Injection&#39;), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component.</p> <p>The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcc7-c8mp-34qx https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203