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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:37:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-10161</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10161</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-10161</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10161</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-333496</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333496</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-333496</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333496</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49097</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49097</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&amp;#39;Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component&amp;#39;s other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgra…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&amp;#39;Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component&amp;#39;s other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgra…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49097</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7 — Apache Camel-IRC: The irc.sendTo (and other irc.*) Exchange header constants used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-463m-2hr2-q2j7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-irc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&amp;#39;Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component&amp;#39;s other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgra…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-irc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (&amp;#39;Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component&amp;#39;s other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgra…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-463m-2hr2-q2j7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2203 — Apache Camel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203</guid>
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