<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 17:56:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-359536</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359536</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-359536</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359536</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48786</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48786</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team&amp;#39;s agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team&amp;#39;s agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48786</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg — Fleet: Observer-class users can view team enroll secrets and credential-bearing configuration via target search endpoint</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88p2-jj8w-j8qg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The target search endpoint (`POST /api/latest/fleet/targets`) returned team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers; the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with Observer, Observer+, or Technician role (global or team-scoped) could retrieve unmasked team enroll secrets and team agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With a leaked team enroll secret, an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team. If the team&amp;#39;s agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were also exposed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- v4.87.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Rotate team enroll secrets for any team that may have been exposed
- Rotate any credentials stored in team agent options (AWS keys, proxy passwords, session tokens)
- Restrict Observer and Technician roles to fully trusted users until the patch is applied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet thanks @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Send an email to [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)
Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The target search endpoint (`POST /api/latest/fleet/targets`) returned team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers; the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with Observer, Observer+, or Technician role (global or team-scoped) could retrieve unmasked team enroll secrets and team agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With a leaked team enroll secret, an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team. If the team&amp;#39;s agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were also exposed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- v4.87.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Rotate team enroll secrets for any team that may have been exposed
- Rotate any credentials stored in team agent options (AWS keys, proxy passwords, session tokens)
- Restrict Observer and Technician roles to fully trusted users until the patch is applied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet thanks @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Send an email to [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)
Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88p2-jj8w-j8qg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2788 — Fleet: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2788</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um SQL-Injection durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um SQL-Injection durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2788</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
