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CLEANSTART-2026-OS65613 — Security fix for CVE-2026-48712 applied in: azure-functions-node 4.1052.200-r0

Affected: CleanStart: azure-functions-node

Security vulnerability affects the azure-functions-node package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.

EUVD-2026-329305

fkie_cve-2026-48712

protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. Prior to 7.6.1 and 8.4.1, protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated toObject() conversion and the custom google.protobuf.Any JSON conversion path. A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested Any values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.6.1 and 8.4.1.

GHSA-wcpc-wj8m-hjx6 — protobufjs: Denial of service through unbounded Any expansion during JSON conversion

Affected: npm: protobufjs

## Summary

protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated `toObject()` conversion and the custom `google.protobuf.Any` JSON conversion path.

A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested `Any` values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON.

## Impact

An attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause message conversion to fail with a stack overflow.

This affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf input containing `google.protobuf.Any` values and then convert decoded messages to JSON or plain objects with JSON conversion enabled, for example through `JSON.stringify(message)`, `Message#toJSON()`, or `Type.toObject(message, { json: true })`.

Applications that only decode and re-encode protobuf binary data without converting decoded messages to JSON are not directly affected by this issue.

## Preconditions

* The application must decode protobuf binary data influenced by an attacker. * The application schema must include `google.protobuf.Any`, and the referenced `type_url` must resolve to a message type in the loaded protobuf root. * The application must convert the decoded message to JSON or a plain object through an affected conversion path. * The crafted input must contain deeply nested `Any` values that are expanded during conversion.

## Workarounds…

RHSA-2026:52768 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.9.8 release.

multer: Multer: Denial of Service via aborted or malformed multipart uploads multer: Multer: Denial of Service via deeply nested field names in multipart form data brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity js-cookie: JavaScript Cookie: Cookie attribute manipulation via prototype pollution grpc-js: @grpc/grpc-js: Server crash via malformed HTTP/2 stream initiation grpc-js: @grpc/grpc-js: Client or server crash via malformed compressed message protobufjs: protobufjs: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion with crafted protobuf payload dompurify: DOMPurify: Cross-site scripting vulnerability allows code execution js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service via crafted YAML documents protobufjs: protobufjs: Denial of Service via crafted .proto schema @opentelemetry/propagator-jaeger: OpenTelemetry JavaScript: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP header decoding