https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 18 Oct 2026 10:49:30 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322191 EUVD-2026-322191 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322191 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48687 <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48687 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qx97-6jw5-h44w <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qx97-6jw5-h44w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48687 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:25.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:26.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: fastnetmon</p> <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:25.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:26.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: fastnetmon</p> <p>FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec(&#34;echo `date` \&#34;- {FASTNETMON] - &#34; . $msg . &#34; \&#34; &gt;&gt; &#34; . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon&#39;s C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48687