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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 21:11:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322221</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322221</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322221</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322221</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48150</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48150</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, /api/public/v1/roles/assign is guarded by the builderOrAdmin middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the x-budibase-app-id header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (builder.apps set but builder.global unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants builder.global=true or admin.global=true on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the EXPANDED_PUBLIC_API feature. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, /api/public/v1/roles/assign is guarded by the builderOrAdmin middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the x-budibase-app-id header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (builder.apps set but builder.global unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants builder.global=true or admin.global=true on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the EXPANDED_PUBLIC_API feature. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48150</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6xp4-cf37-ppjh — Budibase: Workspace-scoped builder escalates to global admin via /api/public/v1/roles/assign</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6xp4-cf37-ppjh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`/api/public/v1/roles/assign` is guarded by the `builderOrAdmin` middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the `x-budibase-app-id` header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (`builder.apps` set but `builder.global` unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants `builder.global=true` or `admin.global=true` on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the `EXPANDED_PUBLIC_API` feature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Controller (`packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts:13-17`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
export async function assignAppBuilder(ctx: Ctx) {
  const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body
  await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps)
  ctx.body = { data: { userIds } }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing filters `assignmentProps`. The request body&amp;#39;s `builder` and `admin` keys flow directly into the SDK.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SDK (`packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts:17-47`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
export async function assign(userIds: string[], opts: AssignmentOpts) {
  if (!(await isExpandedPublicApiEnabled())) {
    throw new Error(&amp;#34;Unable to assign roles - license required.&amp;#34;)
  }
  const users = await userDB.bulkGet(userIds)
  for (let user o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`/api/public/v1/roles/assign` is guarded by the `builderOrAdmin` middleware, which passes any user who is a builder for the app id in the `x-budibase-app-id` header. That check admits both global builders and workspace-scoped builders (`builder.apps` set but `builder.global` unset). The controller then spreads the request body into the SDK call, and the SDK grants `builder.global=true` or `admin.global=true` on whichever user ids the caller supplies. Bob, a workspace-scoped builder with an API key, promotes himself or any other user to global admin with one POST. The whole flow is tenant-wide privilege escalation from an app-level role, available to anyone with an Enterprise license that unlocks the `EXPANDED_PUBLIC_API` feature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Controller (`packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts:13-17`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
export async function assignAppBuilder(ctx: Ctx) {
  const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body
  await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps)
  ctx.body = { data: { userIds } }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nothing filters `assignmentProps`. The request body&amp;#39;s `builder` and `admin` keys flow directly into the SDK.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SDK (`packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts:17-47`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
export async function assign(userIds: string[], opts: AssignmentOpts) {
  if (!(await isExpandedPublicApiEnabled())) {
    throw new Error(&amp;#34;Unable to assign roles - license required.&amp;#34;)
  }
  const users = await userDB.bulkGet(userIds)
  for (let user o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6xp4-cf37-ppjh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1629 — Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1629</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1629</guid>
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