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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 23:21:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-10832</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10832</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-10832</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10832</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-breezy-CVE-2026-47712 — Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-breezy-cve-2026-47712</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: breezy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: breezy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-breezy-cve-2026-47712</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-MI51590 — Security fixes in kserve-storage-controller 0.19.0-r0</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mi51590</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: kserve-storage-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package kserve-storage-controller version 0.19.0-r0 fixes 91 vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-7592, CVE-2024-9287...&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: kserve-storage-controller&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package kserve-storage-controller version 0.19.0-r0 fixes 91 vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-7592, CVE-2024-9287...&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mi51590</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-326582</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326582</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-326582</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326582</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47712</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47712</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to   porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against  os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to   porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against  os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47712</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f — Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-555p-6grf-mh7f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-555p-6grf-mh7f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10900-1 — python311-dulwich-1.2.5-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10900-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;python311-dulwich-1.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;python311-dulwich-1.2.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10900-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2462 — Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2462</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \),   parent-directory components (..), and   other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :)  were preserved verbatim and passed   straight into os.path.join(outdir,   f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- x/../../x produced &amp;lt;outdir&amp;gt;/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving
  two directories above outdir.
- x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Related issues from the same root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on  Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process&amp;#39;s write permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other char…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2462</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-47712</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47712</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:25.10: dulwich, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to   porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against  os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:25.10: dulwich, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dulwich&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit&amp;#39;s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f&amp;#34;{i:04d}-{summary}.patch&amp;#34;). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git&amp;#39;s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to   porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against  os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47712</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2455 — Oracle Solaris Drittanbieterkomponenten: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2455</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in verschiedenen Komponenten von Drittanbietern in Oracle Solaris ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in verschiedenen Komponenten von Drittanbietern in Oracle Solaris ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2455</guid>
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