https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 05:25:22 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15475 bdu:2026-15475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0933 certfr-2026-avi-0933 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0933 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-371754 EUVD-2026-371754 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-371754 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47691 <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain&#39;s key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain&#39;s key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47691 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5pvg-856g-cp85 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-resolver-dns</p> <p>### Summary Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`).</p> <p>### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName.</p> <p>This means if the resolver queries evil.co.uk., it will accept an NS record claiming authority over co.uk.. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key (co.uk.). This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under co.uk..</p> <p>The `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#cache` method only prevents caching if the record is for the root zone (dots == 1).</p> <p>### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning. Any application using Netty&#39;s DNS resolver is impacted.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-resolver-dns</p> <p>### Summary Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`).</p> <p>### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName.</p> <p>This means if the resolver queries evil.co.uk., it will accept an NS record claiming authority over co.uk.. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key (co.uk.). This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under co.uk..</p> <p>The `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#cache` method only prevents caching if the record is for the root zone (dots == 1).</p> <p>### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning. Any application using Netty&#39;s DNS resolver is impacted.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5pvg-856g-cp85 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47691 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain&#39;s key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty&#39;s `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record&#39;s name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain&#39;s key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain&#39;s key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47691 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814