https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 05:14:49 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339402 EUVD-2026-339402 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339402 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47410 <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47410 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137. **Root cause:** the production-mode guard checks `os.environ.get(&#34;PLATFORM_ENV&#34;, &#34;dev&#34;) != &#34;dev&#34;` — but the default is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so a clean deployment that just imports the package and runs `uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:app` proceeds with the hardcoded secret. The package documentation does not warn loudly enough that BOTH variables must be set; the guard suppresses itself when either condition is missed. JWT verification at line 129 trusts whatever the token says (`sub`, `email`, `name`) once the HMAC-SHA256 signature validates against the publicly-known secret. Since the verifier accepts forged tokens for any user_id, the attacker becomes that user across every authenticated route.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137.…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137. **Root cause:** the production-mode guard checks `os.environ.get(&#34;PLATFORM_ENV&#34;, &#34;dev&#34;) != &#34;dev&#34;` — but the default is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so a clean deployment that just imports the package and runs `uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:app` proceeds with the hardcoded secret. The package documentation does not warn loudly enough that BOTH variables must be set; the guard suppresses itself when either condition is missed. JWT verification at line 129 trusts whatever the token says (`sub`, `email`, `name`) once the HMAC-SHA256 signature validates against the publicly-known secret. Since the verifier accepts forged tokens for any user_id, the attacker becomes that user across every authenticated route.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137.…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-479 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137. **Root cause:** the production-mode guard checks `os.environ.get(&#34;PLATFORM_ENV&#34;, &#34;dev&#34;) != &#34;dev&#34;` — but the default is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so a clean deployment that just imports the package and runs `uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:app` proceeds with the hardcoded secret. The package documentation does not warn loudly enough that BOTH variables must be set; the guard suppresses itself when either condition is missed. JWT verification at line 129 trusts whatever the token says (`sub`, `email`, `name`) once the HMAC-SHA256 signature validates against the publicly-known secret. Since the verifier accepts forged tokens for any user_id, the attacker becomes that user across every authenticated route.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137.…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `&#34;dev-secret-change-me&#34;` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != &#34;dev&#34;`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137. **Root cause:** the production-mode guard checks `os.environ.get(&#34;PLATFORM_ENV&#34;, &#34;dev&#34;) != &#34;dev&#34;` — but the default is `&#34;dev&#34;`, so a clean deployment that just imports the package and runs `uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:app` proceeds with the hardcoded secret. The package documentation does not warn loudly enough that BOTH variables must be set; the guard suppresses itself when either condition is missed. JWT verification at line 129 trusts whatever the token says (`sub`, `email`, `name`) once the HMAC-SHA256 signature validates against the publicly-known secret. Since the verifier accepts forged tokens for any user_id, the attacker becomes that user across every authenticated route.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py`, lines 25-36 and 114-137.…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-479