https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 06:22:17 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339363 EUVD-2026-339363 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339363 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47407 <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network pos…</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network pos…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47407 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h8q5-cp56-rr65 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`.</p> <p>A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete.</p> <p>There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced.</p> <p>Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system.</p> <p>## Affected functionality</p> <p>Every nested-resourc…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`.</p> <p>A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete.</p> <p>There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced.</p> <p>Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system.</p> <p>## Affected functionality</p> <p>Every nested-resourc…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h8q5-cp56-rr65 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-482 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`.</p> <p>A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete.</p> <p>There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced.</p> <p>Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system.</p> <p>## Affected functionality</p> <p>Every nested-resour…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource&#39;s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL&#39;s `workspace_id`.</p> <p>A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace&#39;s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete.</p> <p>There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced.</p> <p>Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system.</p> <p>## Affected functionality</p> <p>Every nested-resour…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-482