https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:42:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15474 bdu:2026-15474 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15474 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1032 certfr-2026-avi-1032 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1032 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: keycloak</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bk55944 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326874 EUVD-2026-326874 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326874 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47244 <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47244 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5x3r-wrvg-rp6q <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2</p> <p>### Impact DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work.</p> <p>### Resources https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.html#section-6.5.2</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2</p> <p>### Impact DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work.</p> <p>### Resources https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.html#section-6.5.2</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5x3r-wrvg-rp6q https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11033-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> <p>eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:26017 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47244 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-47244 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1814