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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 18:39:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-339211</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339211</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-339211</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339211</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46428</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46428</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46428</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53 — lettre has TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4pj9-g833-qx53</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lettre&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently
disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)
configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate
for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN
credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the
`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are
unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
boring&amp;#39;s `SslConnectorBuilder::set_verify_hostname(bool)` /
`verify_hostname(bool)` API takes a *verify* flag — `true` means enforce
hostname verification, `false` means skip it. (Boring docs:
https://docs.rs/boring/latest/boring/ssl/struct.ConnectConfiguration.html#method.set_verify_hostname)
lettre&amp;#39;s `TlsParametersBuilder` exposes the opposite-named flag
`accept_invalid_hostnames: bool` — `true` means *accept invalid* (skip
verification), `false` means verify. lettre passes this flag directly to
boring at both TLS-upgrade sites, inverting the semantics:
src/transport/smtp/client/net.rs:202 (sync)
    .verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)
src/transport/smtp/client/async_net.rs:377 (async)
    config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);
Concrete behaviour under `boring-tls`:
  * accept_invalid_hostnames = false  (the strict default)
      → set_verify_hostname(false)  → hostname verification SKIPPED
        (wrong; the caller asked for strict verification)
  * accept_invalid_hostnames = true   (explici…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lettre&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently
disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)
configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate
for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN
credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the
`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are
unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
boring&amp;#39;s `SslConnectorBuilder::set_verify_hostname(bool)` /
`verify_hostname(bool)` API takes a *verify* flag — `true` means enforce
hostname verification, `false` means skip it. (Boring docs:
https://docs.rs/boring/latest/boring/ssl/struct.ConnectConfiguration.html#method.set_verify_hostname)
lettre&amp;#39;s `TlsParametersBuilder` exposes the opposite-named flag
`accept_invalid_hostnames: bool` — `true` means *accept invalid* (skip
verification), `false` means verify. lettre passes this flag directly to
boring at both TLS-upgrade sites, inverting the semantics:
src/transport/smtp/client/net.rs:202 (sync)
    .verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)
src/transport/smtp/client/async_net.rs:377 (async)
    config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);
Concrete behaviour under `boring-tls`:
  * accept_invalid_hostnames = false  (the strict default)
      → set_verify_hostname(false)  → hostname verification SKIPPED
        (wrong; the caller asked for strict verification)
  * accept_invalid_hostnames = true   (explici…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4pj9-g833-qx53</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0141 — TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0141</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lettre&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently
disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)
configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate
for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN
credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the
`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are
unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug was introduced in v0.10.1 and persists through v0.11.21 (latest).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lettre&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An inverted-boolean bug in lettre&amp;#39;s `boring-tls` integration silently
disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)
configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate
for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN
credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the
`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are
unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug was introduced in v0.10.1 and persists through v0.11.21 (latest).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0141</guid>
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