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EUVD-2026-318629

fkie_cve-2026-46356

Fleet is open source device management software. Prior to version 4.80.1, a vulnerability in Fleet's IP extraction logic allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass API rate limiting by spoofing client IP headers. This may allow brute-force login attempts or other abuse against Fleet instances exposed to the public internet. Fleet extracted client IP addresses from request headers (`True-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-For`) without validating that those headers originate from a trusted proxy. The extracted IP is used as the key for rate limiting and IP ban decisions. As a result, an attacker could rotate the value of these headers on each request, causing Fleet to treat each attempt as coming from a different client. This effectively bypasses per-IP rate limits on sensitive endpoints such as the login API, enabling unrestricted brute-force or credential stuffing attacks. This issue primarily affects Fleet instances that are directly exposed to the internet without a reverse proxy that overwrites forwarded-IP headers. Instances behind a properly configured proxy or WAF are less affected. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should ensure Fleet is deployed behind a reverse proxy (e.g., nginx, Cloudflare, AWS ALB) that overwrites `X-Forwarded-For` with the true client IP, and apply rate limiting at the proxy or WAF layer.

GHSA-mxmp-wr3w-rvqx — Fleet: IP spoofing allows bypassing API rate limiting

Affected: Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4

### Summary A vulnerability in Fleet's IP extraction logic allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass API rate limiting by spoofing client IP headers. This may allow brute-force login attempts or other abuse against Fleet instances exposed to the public internet.

### Impact Fleet extracted client IP addresses from request headers (`True-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-For`) without validating that those headers originate from a trusted proxy. The extracted IP is used as the key for rate limiting and IP ban decisions.

As a result, an attacker could rotate the value of these headers on each request, causing Fleet to treat each attempt as coming from a different client. This effectively bypasses per-IP rate limits on sensitive endpoints such as the login API, enabling unrestricted brute-force or credential stuffing attacks.

This issue primarily affects Fleet instances that are directly exposed to the internet without a reverse proxy that overwrites forwarded-IP headers. Instances behind a properly configured proxy or WAF are less affected.

### Workarounds If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should ensure Fleet is deployed behind a reverse proxy (e.g., nginx, Cloudflare, AWS ALB) that overwrites `X-Forwarded-For` with the true client IP, and apply rate limiting at the proxy or WAF layer.

### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com) Join #fleet in…

WID-SEC-W-2026-1553 — Fleet: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.