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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:59:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-46110</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46110</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46110</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0731 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits Microsoft. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0731</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-348006</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348006</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-348006</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348006</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46110</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46110</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s
physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
&amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s
physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
&amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46110</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s
physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
&amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s
physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
&amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-46110 — net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46110</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-46110</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46110</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10954-1 — kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:22043-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22043-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22043-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-46110</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46110</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 161 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both &amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34; In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 161 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer&amp;#39;s physical address and a status flag (&amp;#34;OWN&amp;#34;) indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both &amp;#34;submissions&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;completions.&amp;#34; In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46110</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1700 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700</guid>
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