https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 07:04:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46064 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731 certfr-2026-avi-0731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327107 EUVD-2026-327107 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327107 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46064 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()</p> <p>The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.</p> <p>Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.</p> <p>Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.</p> <p>Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()</p> <p>The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.</p> <p>Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.</p> <p>Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.</p> <p>Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4p2m-h7j8-hhxj <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()</p> <p>The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.</p> <p>Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.</p> <p>Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.</p> <p>Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()</p> <p>The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.</p> <p>Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.</p> <p>Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.</p> <p>Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4p2m-h7j8-hhxj https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46064 msrc_CVE-2026-46064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46064 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller&#39;s free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700