https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 01:44:08 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46063 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46063 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731 certfr-2026-avi-0731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327106 EUVD-2026-327106 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327106 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46063 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn</p> <p>During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA.</p> <p>Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.</p> <p>Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.</p> <p>Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA.</p> <p>These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.</p> <p>Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be a…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn</p> <p>During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA.</p> <p>Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.</p> <p>Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.</p> <p>Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA.</p> <p>These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.</p> <p>Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be a…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46063 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5h69-gpmh-v98w <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn</p> <p>During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA.</p> <p>Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.</p> <p>Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.</p> <p>Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA.</p> <p>These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.</p> <p>Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be a…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn</p> <p>During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA.</p> <p>Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.</p> <p>Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.</p> <p>Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA.</p> <p>These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.</p> <p>Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be a…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5h69-gpmh-v98w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46063 msrc_CVE-2026-46063 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-46063 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22521-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22521-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46063 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 153 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA. Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock. Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace. Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA. These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist. Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be assumed…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 153 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can&#39;t assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA. Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock. Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace. Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA. These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist. Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be assumed…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46063 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700