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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:56:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-46008</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-46008</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0831 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0831</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0831</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0831</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-327076</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327076</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-327076</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46008</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. 
damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. 
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. 
damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. 
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46008</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5mcx-8cmv-fvgx</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5mcx-8cmv-fvgx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. 
damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. 
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. 
damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. 
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5mcx-8cmv-fvgx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10954-1 — kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.11-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10954-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-46008</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request. The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk() request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request registr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. damos_walk() adds the caller&amp;#39;s request to the queue first.  After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for the kdamond&amp;#39;s handling of the newly added request. The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race with damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let&amp;#39;s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk() request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx-&amp;gt;kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the damon_ctx-&amp;gt;walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request registr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-46008</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1700 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1700</guid>
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