https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 14:21:45 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0617 certfr-2026-avi-0617 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0617 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336746 EUVD-2026-336746 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-336746 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45755 <p>Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 7.4.12 and 8.0.12, MailtrapRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Mailtrap delivery, bounce, open, click, or spam events. This issue is fixed in versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.12.</p> <p>Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 7.4.12 and 8.0.12, MailtrapRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Mailtrap delivery, bounce, open, click, or spam events. This issue is fixed in versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.12.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45755 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59f3-vp2f-mp9w <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: symfony/mailtrap-mailer, Packagist: symfony/symfony</p> <p>### Description</p> <p>The Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application&#39;s webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.</p> <p>As a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.</p> <p>### Resolution</p> <p>`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.</p> <p>When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.</p> <p>The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/4e0467e4e182cf2e704a3d9e1bc1a6be65d52ab8) for branch 7.4.</p> <p>### Credits</p> <p>Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois providing the fix.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: symfony/mailtrap-mailer, Packagist: symfony/symfony</p> <p>### Description</p> <p>The Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application&#39;s webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.</p> <p>As a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.</p> <p>### Resolution</p> <p>`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.</p> <p>When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.</p> <p>The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/4e0467e4e182cf2e704a3d9e1bc1a6be65d52ab8) for branch 7.4.</p> <p>### Credits</p> <p>Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois providing the fix.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59f3-vp2f-mp9w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-45755 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:25.10: symfony, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: symfony</p> <p>Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 7.4.12 and 8.0.12, MailtrapRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Mailtrap delivery, bounce, open, click, or spam events. This issue is fixed in versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.12.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: symfony, Ubuntu:25.10: symfony, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: symfony</p> <p>Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 7.4.12 and 8.0.12, MailtrapRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Mailtrap delivery, bounce, open, click, or spam events. This issue is fixed in versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.12.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-45755