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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 03:10:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-07138</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07138</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07138</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07138</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319369</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319369</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319369</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319369</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45402</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45402</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45402</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r472-mw7m-967f — Open WebUI: Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r472-mw7m-967f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied `file_id` and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Path 1 — Folder knowledge ingestion via `folders.update`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py:156` — `POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update` accepts a `FolderUpdateForm` whose `data: Optional[dict]` field is written verbatim into the folder. The folder consumer at `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2409` spreads `folder.data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` directly into `form_data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` for the next chat completion, which becomes RAG context. There is no per-file ownership check at the writer (the update handler) and no per-file ownership check at the reader (the middleware folder consumer) — only the *folder list* endpoint (`folders.py:78-94`) cleans up by stripping inaccessible files, and that runs lazily at folder-list time rather than at chat time. An attacker with a victim&amp;#39;s file UUID can write `data: {&amp;#34;files&amp;#34;: [{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;}]}` in…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied `file_id` and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Path 1 — Folder knowledge ingestion via `folders.update`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py:156` — `POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update` accepts a `FolderUpdateForm` whose `data: Optional[dict]` field is written verbatim into the folder. The folder consumer at `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2409` spreads `folder.data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` directly into `form_data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` for the next chat completion, which becomes RAG context. There is no per-file ownership check at the writer (the update handler) and no per-file ownership check at the reader (the middleware folder consumer) — only the *folder list* endpoint (`folders.py:78-94`) cleans up by stripping inaccessible files, and that runs lazily at folder-list time rather than at chat time. An attacker with a victim&amp;#39;s file UUID can write `data: {&amp;#34;files&amp;#34;: [{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;}]}` in…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r472-mw7m-967f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2752 — Open WebUI: Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2752</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied `file_id` and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Path 1 — Folder knowledge ingestion via `folders.update`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py:156` — `POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update` accepts a `FolderUpdateForm` whose `data: Optional[dict]` field is written verbatim into the folder. The folder consumer at `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2409` spreads `folder.data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` directly into `form_data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` for the next chat completion, which becomes RAG context. There is no per-file ownership check at the writer (the update handler) and no per-file ownership check at the reader (the middleware folder consumer) — only the *folder list* endpoint (`folders.py:78-94`) cleans up by stripping inaccessible files, and that runs lazily at folder-list time rather than at chat time. An attacker with a victim&amp;#39;s file UUID can write `data: {&amp;#34;files&amp;#34;: [{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;}]}` in…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied `file_id` and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Path 1 — Folder knowledge ingestion via `folders.update`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py:156` — `POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update` accepts a `FolderUpdateForm` whose `data: Optional[dict]` field is written verbatim into the folder. The folder consumer at `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2409` spreads `folder.data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` directly into `form_data[&amp;#39;files&amp;#39;]` for the next chat completion, which becomes RAG context. There is no per-file ownership check at the writer (the update handler) and no per-file ownership check at the reader (the middleware folder consumer) — only the *folder list* endpoint (`folders.py:78-94`) cleans up by stripping inaccessible files, and that runs lazily at folder-list time rather than at chat time. An attacker with a victim&amp;#39;s file UUID can write `data: {&amp;#34;files&amp;#34;: [{&amp;#34;id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;victim&amp;gt;&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;file&amp;#34;}]}` in…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2752</guid>
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