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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 22:49:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-07458</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07458</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07458</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07458</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319195</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319195</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319195</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319195</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45318</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45318</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, his advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS (CVE-2026-44549). The same root cause — XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html() output rendered via {@html excelHtml} without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, his advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS (CVE-2026-44549). The same root cause — XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html() output rendered via {@html excelHtml} without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45318</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hcwp-82g6-8wxc — Open WebUI has stored XSS via unsanitized Office/Excel/DOCX file preview rendering ({@html} without DOMPurify)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcwp-82g6-8wxc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Related advisory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was 
publicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) 
(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output 
rendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime 
after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version 
range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related 
`fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` 
(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory&amp;#39;s scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte&amp;#39;s `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**But 3 file-preview paths skip it**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Related advisory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was 
publicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) 
(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output 
rendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime 
after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version 
range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related 
`fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` 
(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory&amp;#39;s scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte&amp;#39;s `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**But 3 file-preview paths skip it**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcwp-82g6-8wxc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2731 — Open WebUI has stored XSS via unsanitized Office/Excel/DOCX file preview rendering ({@html} without DOMPurify)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2731</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Related advisory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was 
publicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) 
(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output 
rendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime 
after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version 
range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related 
`fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` 
(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory&amp;#39;s scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte&amp;#39;s `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**But 3 file-preview paths skip it**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Related advisory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was 
publicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) 
(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output 
rendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime 
after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version 
range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related 
`fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` 
(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory&amp;#39;s scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte&amp;#39;s `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**But 3 file-preview paths skip it**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2731</guid>
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