<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 12:49:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338575</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338575</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338575</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338575</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44968</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44968</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;dbt-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for interacting with dbt. Prior to 1.17.1, _run_dbt_command() in src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py appended unsanitized node_selection and resource_type values to the dbt subprocess argument list, allowing an MCP client to inject dbt global flags such as --profiles-dir, --project-dir, and --target into subprocess.Popen even though shell=False prevents shell metacharacter injection. This issue is fixed in version 1.17.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;dbt-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for interacting with dbt. Prior to 1.17.1, _run_dbt_command() in src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py appended unsanitized node_selection and resource_type values to the dbt subprocess argument list, allowing an MCP client to inject dbt global flags such as --profiles-dir, --project-dir, and --target into subprocess.Popen even though shell=False prevents shell metacharacter injection. This issue is fixed in version 1.17.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44968</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xpww-f6pm-cfhq — dbt MCP Server has an Argument Injection in dbt CLI Tool Wrappers via node_selection and resource_type Parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xpww-f6pm-cfhq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dbt-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_run_dbt_command()` in `src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py` constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags — such as `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` — by crafting the `node_selection` string (Vector 1) or the `resource_type` JSON array (Vector 2). Because `subprocess.Popen` is called with `shell=False` and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vector 1 — `node_selection` string**
Affected tools: `build`, `compile`, `run`, `test`, `clone`, `list`, `get_node_details_dev`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py  lines 77–79
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
    selector_params = node_selection.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)
    command.extend([&amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;] + selector_params)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`str.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)` does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input `&amp;#34;my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil&amp;#34;` produces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````
[&amp;#34;dbt&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--no-use-colors&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;my_model&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--profiles-dir&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/tmp/evil&amp;#34;]
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dbt parses the injected `--profiles-dir` as a global opt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dbt-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_run_dbt_command()` in `src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py` constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags — such as `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` — by crafting the `node_selection` string (Vector 1) or the `resource_type` JSON array (Vector 2). Because `subprocess.Popen` is called with `shell=False` and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vector 1 — `node_selection` string**
Affected tools: `build`, `compile`, `run`, `test`, `clone`, `list`, `get_node_details_dev`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py  lines 77–79
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
    selector_params = node_selection.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)
    command.extend([&amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;] + selector_params)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`str.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)` does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input `&amp;#34;my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil&amp;#34;` produces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````
[&amp;#34;dbt&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--no-use-colors&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;my_model&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--profiles-dir&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/tmp/evil&amp;#34;]
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dbt parses the injected `--profiles-dir` as a global opt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xpww-f6pm-cfhq</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2444 — dbt MCP Server has an Argument Injection in dbt CLI Tool Wrappers via node_selection and resource_type Parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2444</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dbt-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_run_dbt_command()` in `src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py` constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags — such as `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` — by crafting the `node_selection` string (Vector 1) or the `resource_type` JSON array (Vector 2). Because `subprocess.Popen` is called with `shell=False` and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vector 1 — `node_selection` string**
Affected tools: `build`, `compile`, `run`, `test`, `clone`, `list`, `get_node_details_dev`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py  lines 77–79
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
    selector_params = node_selection.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)
    command.extend([&amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;] + selector_params)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`str.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)` does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input `&amp;#34;my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil&amp;#34;` produces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````
[&amp;#34;dbt&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--no-use-colors&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;my_model&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--profiles-dir&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/tmp/evil&amp;#34;]
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dbt parses the injected `--profiles-dir` as a global opt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: dbt-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_run_dbt_command()` in `src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py` constructs the dbt subprocess argument list by appending user-supplied MCP tool parameters without sanitization. Two independent injection vectors exist. An MCP client can inject arbitrary dbt global flags — such as `--profiles-dir`, `--project-dir`, and `--target` — by crafting the `node_selection` string (Vector 1) or the `resource_type` JSON array (Vector 2). Because `subprocess.Popen` is called with `shell=False` and a list argument, shell metacharacter injection is not possible; however, this provides no defense against argument list injection (CWE-88), where attacker-controlled tokens are interpreted by the target process as flags rather than values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vector 1 — `node_selection` string**
Affected tools: `build`, `compile`, `run`, `test`, `clone`, `list`, `get_node_details_dev`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/dbt_mcp/dbt_cli/tools.py  lines 77–79
if node_selection and isinstance(node_selection, str):
    selector_params = node_selection.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)
    command.extend([&amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;] + selector_params)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`str.split(&amp;#34; &amp;#34;)` does not distinguish dbt selector tokens from flag tokens. Input `&amp;#34;my_model --profiles-dir /tmp/evil&amp;#34;` produces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````
[&amp;#34;dbt&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--no-use-colors&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,
 &amp;#34;--select&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;my_model&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;--profiles-dir&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/tmp/evil&amp;#34;]
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dbt parses the injected `--profiles-dir` as a global opt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2444</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
