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bdu:2026-08529

EUVD-2026-322955

fkie_cve-2026-44850

Portainer Community Edition is a lightweight service delivery platform for containerized applications that can be used to manage Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes and ACI environments. From 2.33.0 to before 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0, Portainer offers an environment-level Disable bind mounts for non-administrators security setting that blocks regular users from binding host paths into containers they create through the Portainer-mediated Docker API. The check that enforces this setting only inspected the legacy HostConfig.Binds array on the container-create proxy and never looked at the equivalent HostConfig.Mounts array. Any authenticated user with rights to create containers on a Docker environment where the restriction is enabled could submit a bind-typed entry under HostConfig.Mounts and mount any host path into their container. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0.

GHSA-7fw3-x4r2-g7wc — Portainer has a bind-mount restriction bypass via HostConfig.Mounts

Affected: Go: github.com/portainer/portainer

## Summary

Portainer offers an environment-level **Disable bind mounts for non-administrators** security setting that blocks regular users from binding host paths into containers they create through the Portainer-mediated Docker API. The check that enforces this setting only inspected the legacy `HostConfig.Binds` array on the container-create proxy and never looked at the equivalent `HostConfig.Mounts` array. Any authenticated user with rights to create containers on a Docker environment where the restriction is enabled could submit a `bind`-typed entry under `HostConfig.Mounts` and mount any host path into their container.

The two fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon — both produce real bind mounts at runtime — so a check that inspects only one is functionally equivalent to no check at all. The same primitive is correctly enforced on Swarm service create against `TaskTemplate.ContainerSpec.Mounts`; the gap was specific to the `POST /containers/create` proxy path.

Exploitation requires a regular user with container-create rights on an environment that has the restriction enabled. Such a user can mount any host path read-write or read-only into a container they own and use the resulting view of the host filesystem to read or write anything the Docker daemon's user can — typically `root`. Bind-mount restriction is the primary defence against host filesystem exposure on shared environments where regular users are otherwise permitted to deploy containers.

## Seve…