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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 22:28:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318571</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318571</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318571</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318571</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44827</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44827</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Diffusers is the a library for  pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, diffusers 0.37.0 allows remote code execution without the trust_remote_code=True safeguard when loading pipelines from Hugging Face Hub repositories. The _resolve_custom_pipeline_and_cls function in pipeline_loading_utils.py performs string interpolation on the custom_pipeline parameter using f&amp;#34;{custom_pipeline}.py&amp;#34;. When custom_pipeline is not supplied by the user, it defaults to None, which Python interpolates as the literal string &amp;#34;None.py&amp;#34;. If an attacker publishes a Hub repository containing a file named None.py with a class that subclasses DiffusionPipeline, the file is automatically downloaded and executed during a standard DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained() call with no additional keyword arguments. The trust_remote_code check in DiffusionPipeline.download() is bypassed because it evaluates custom_pipeline is not None as False (since the kwarg was never supplied), while the downstream code path that actually loads the module resolves the None value into a valid filename. An attacker can achieve silent arbitrary code execution by publishing a malicious model repository with a None.py file and a standard-looking model_index.json that references a legitimate pipeline class name, requiring only that a victim calls from_pretrained on the repository. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Diffusers is the a library for  pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, diffusers 0.37.0 allows remote code execution without the trust_remote_code=True safeguard when loading pipelines from Hugging Face Hub repositories. The _resolve_custom_pipeline_and_cls function in pipeline_loading_utils.py performs string interpolation on the custom_pipeline parameter using f&amp;#34;{custom_pipeline}.py&amp;#34;. When custom_pipeline is not supplied by the user, it defaults to None, which Python interpolates as the literal string &amp;#34;None.py&amp;#34;. If an attacker publishes a Hub repository containing a file named None.py with a class that subclasses DiffusionPipeline, the file is automatically downloaded and executed during a standard DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained() call with no additional keyword arguments. The trust_remote_code check in DiffusionPipeline.download() is bypassed because it evaluates custom_pipeline is not None as False (since the kwarg was never supplied), while the downstream code path that actually loads the module resolves the None value into a valid filename. An attacker can achieve silent arbitrary code execution by publishing a malicious model repository with a None.py file and a standard-looking model_index.json that references a legitimate pipeline class name, requiring only that a victim calls from_pretrained on the repository. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44827</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: GHSA-j7w6-vpvq-j3gm — Diffusers has a `trust_remote_code` bypass via `custom_pipeline` and local custom components</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j7w6-vpvq-j3gm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: diffusers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Background&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is found in the `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` flow, which is used to load a pipeline from the HuggingFace Hub.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This function accepts an optional `custom_pipeline` keyword argument: the name of a Python file in the repo that contains a custom class inheriting from `DiffusionPipeline`. An equivalent flow is triggered when the `_class_name` field in `model_index.json` (the repo config file) is set to a custom class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any attempt to use a custom pipeline throws the following exception, requesting that `trust_remote_code` is also passed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(
    pretrained_model_name_or_path=&amp;#39;ido-shani/custom-pipeline&amp;#39;,
    custom_pipeline=&amp;#34;custom&amp;#34;
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ValueError: The repository for ido-shani/custom-pipeline contains custom code in
custom.py which must be executed to correctly load the model. You can inspect the
repository content at https://hf.co/ido-shani/custom-pipeline/blob/main/custom.py.
Please pass the argument `trust_remote_code=True` to allow custom code to be run.
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a silent RCE - it allows arbitrary code to be loaded through the custom\_pipeline flow from a Hub repo, with no `custom_pipeline` or `trust_remote_code` kwargs and nothing suspicious in the config. The `from_pretrained` call succeeds and returns a functional pipeline.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Naive Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, all relevant arguments are popped from kwargs and stored in local variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given a `pretrained_model_name_or_path` that is a Hub…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: diffusers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Background&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is found in the `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` flow, which is used to load a pipeline from the HuggingFace Hub.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This function accepts an optional `custom_pipeline` keyword argument: the name of a Python file in the repo that contains a custom class inheriting from `DiffusionPipeline`. An equivalent flow is triggered when the `_class_name` field in `model_index.json` (the repo config file) is set to a custom class.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any attempt to use a custom pipeline throws the following exception, requesting that `trust_remote_code` is also passed:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(
    pretrained_model_name_or_path=&amp;#39;ido-shani/custom-pipeline&amp;#39;,
    custom_pipeline=&amp;#34;custom&amp;#34;
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ValueError: The repository for ido-shani/custom-pipeline contains custom code in
custom.py which must be executed to correctly load the model. You can inspect the
repository content at https://hf.co/ido-shani/custom-pipeline/blob/main/custom.py.
Please pass the argument `trust_remote_code=True` to allow custom code to be run.
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is a silent RCE - it allows arbitrary code to be loaded through the custom\_pipeline flow from a Hub repo, with no `custom_pipeline` or `trust_remote_code` kwargs and nothing suspicious in the config. The `from_pretrained` call succeeds and returns a functional pipeline.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Naive Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, all relevant arguments are popped from kwargs and stored in local variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given a `pretrained_model_name_or_path` that is a Hub…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j7w6-vpvq-j3gm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-41</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-41</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: diffusers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Diffusers is the a library for  pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, diffusers 0.37.0 allows remote code execution without the trust_remote_code=True safeguard when loading pipelines from Hugging Face Hub repositories. The _resolve_custom_pipeline_and_cls function in pipeline_loading_utils.py performs string interpolation on the custom_pipeline parameter using f&amp;#34;{custom_pipeline}.py&amp;#34;. When custom_pipeline is not supplied by the user, it defaults to None, which Python interpolates as the literal string &amp;#34;None.py&amp;#34;. If an attacker publishes a Hub repository containing a file named None.py with a class that subclasses DiffusionPipeline, the file is automatically downloaded and executed during a standard DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained() call with no additional keyword arguments. The trust_remote_code check in DiffusionPipeline.download() is bypassed because it evaluates custom_pipeline is not None as False (since the kwarg was never supplied), while the downstream code path that actually loads the module resolves the None value into a valid filename. An attacker can achieve silent arbitrary code execution by publishing a malicious model repository with a None.py file and a standard-looking model_index.json that references a legitimate pipeline class name, requiring only that a victim calls from_pretrained on the repository. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: diffusers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Diffusers is the a library for  pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, diffusers 0.37.0 allows remote code execution without the trust_remote_code=True safeguard when loading pipelines from Hugging Face Hub repositories. The _resolve_custom_pipeline_and_cls function in pipeline_loading_utils.py performs string interpolation on the custom_pipeline parameter using f&amp;#34;{custom_pipeline}.py&amp;#34;. When custom_pipeline is not supplied by the user, it defaults to None, which Python interpolates as the literal string &amp;#34;None.py&amp;#34;. If an attacker publishes a Hub repository containing a file named None.py with a class that subclasses DiffusionPipeline, the file is automatically downloaded and executed during a standard DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained() call with no additional keyword arguments. The trust_remote_code check in DiffusionPipeline.download() is bypassed because it evaluates custom_pipeline is not None as False (since the kwarg was never supplied), while the downstream code path that actually loads the module resolves the None value into a valid filename. An attacker can achieve silent arbitrary code execution by publishing a malicious model repository with a None.py file and a standard-looking model_index.json that references a legitimate pipeline class name, requiring only that a victim calls from_pretrained on the repository. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-41</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:60520 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.4.4 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:60520</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows: argoproj/argo-workflows is vulnerable to RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted image buffer with zero-valued size field image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted ICNS image buffer mlflow/mlflow: mlflow/mlflow: Unauthenticated remote code execution via unprotected job endpoints mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file read via bypassed source path validation python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames nltk: NLTK: Information disclosure via path traversal vulnerability keras: Keras: Arbitrary code execution via deserialization vulnerability brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity shell-quo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows: argoproj/argo-workflows is vulnerable to RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted image buffer with zero-valued size field image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted ICNS image buffer mlflow/mlflow: mlflow/mlflow: Unauthenticated remote code execution via unprotected job endpoints mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file read via bypassed source path validation python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames nltk: NLTK: Information disclosure via path traversal vulnerability keras: Keras: Arbitrary code execution via deserialization vulnerability brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity shell-quo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:60520</guid>
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