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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 20:26:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319201</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319201</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319201</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319201</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44569</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44569</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.6.19, there&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation. While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.6.19, there&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation. While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44569</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jxwr-g6r6-j3fx — Open WebUI's Insecure Message Access Breaks Authorization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jxwr-g6r6-j3fx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both message content modification and deletion, allowing users to tamper with message integrity and audit trails in collaborative channel environments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source - Sink Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source:** User-controlled `message_id` parameter in URL path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Call Chain:**
1. FastAPI route handlers `update_message_by_id()` (line 450) and `delete_message_by_id()` (line 630) in `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py`
2. Channel-level authorization check: `has_access(user.id, type=&amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, access_control=channel.access_control)` at lines 457 and 637
3. Message retrieval: `Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)` at lines 467 and 647  
4. Channel ID validation: `if message.channel_id != id:` at lines 472 and 652
5. **Missing:** Me…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both message content modification and deletion, allowing users to tamper with message integrity and audit trails in collaborative channel environments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source - Sink Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source:** User-controlled `message_id` parameter in URL path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Call Chain:**
1. FastAPI route handlers `update_message_by_id()` (line 450) and `delete_message_by_id()` (line 630) in `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py`
2. Channel-level authorization check: `has_access(user.id, type=&amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, access_control=channel.access_control)` at lines 457 and 637
3. Message retrieval: `Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)` at lines 467 and 647  
4. Channel ID validation: `if message.channel_id != id:` at lines 472 and 652
5. **Missing:** Me…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jxwr-g6r6-j3fx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2746 — Open WebUI's Insecure Message Access Breaks Authorization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2746</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both message content modification and deletion, allowing users to tamper with message integrity and audit trails in collaborative channel environments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source - Sink Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source:** User-controlled `message_id` parameter in URL path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Call Chain:**
1. FastAPI route handlers `update_message_by_id()` (line 450) and `delete_message_by_id()` (line 630) in `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py`
2. Channel-level authorization check: `has_access(user.id, type=&amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, access_control=channel.access_control)` at lines 457 and 637
3. Message retrieval: `Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)` at lines 467 and 647  
4. Channel ID validation: `if message.channel_id != id:` at lines 472 and 652
5. **Missing:** Me…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There&amp;#39;s an IDOR in the channels message management system that allows authenticated users to modify or delete any message within channels they have read access to. The vulnerability exists in the message update and delete endpoints, which implement channel-level authorization but completely lack message ownership validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the frontend correctly implements ownership checks (showing edit/delete buttons only for message owners or admins), the backend APIs bypass these protections by only validating channel access permissions without verifying that the requesting user owns the target message. This creates a client-side security control bypass where attackers can directly call the APIs to modify other users&amp;#39; messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability affects both message content modification and deletion, allowing users to tamper with message integrity and audit trails in collaborative channel environments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Source - Sink Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source:** User-controlled `message_id` parameter in URL path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Call Chain:**
1. FastAPI route handlers `update_message_by_id()` (line 450) and `delete_message_by_id()` (line 630) in `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py`
2. Channel-level authorization check: `has_access(user.id, type=&amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, access_control=channel.access_control)` at lines 457 and 637
3. Message retrieval: `Messages.get_message_by_id(message_id)` at lines 467 and 647  
4. Channel ID validation: `if message.channel_id != id:` at lines 472 and 652
5. **Missing:** Me…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2746</guid>
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