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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 04:51:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319099</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319099</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319099</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319099</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44556</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44556</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user. This allows any authenticated user to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user. This allows any authenticated user to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44556</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hp5m-24vp-vq2q — Open WebUI's responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hp5m-24vp-vq2q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resol…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resol…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hp5m-24vp-vq2q</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2734 — Open WebUI's responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2734</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resol…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resol…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2734</guid>
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