https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:27:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361088 EUVD-2026-361088 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361088 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44513 <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44513 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h9-4798-4q5v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>A `trust_remote_code` bypass in `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing `trust_remote_code=False` (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the `trust_remote_code` gate was implemented inside `DiffusionPipeline.download()` rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited `download()` also bypassed the security check:</p> <p>1. **Cross-repo `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the gate evaluated against `repoA`&#39;s file list rather than `repoB`&#39;s, so `repoB`&#39;s `pipeline.py` was loaded and executed. 2. **Local snapshot + Hub `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the local-path branch never invoked `download()`, so the gate was never reached and remote code from `repoB` executed. 3. **Local snapshot with custom components.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. `unet/my_unet_model.py`) referenced from `model_index.json` — same root cause; the local path skipped `download()` and custom component code executed.</p> <p>Silent remote code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Anyone calling `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretraine…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>A `trust_remote_code` bypass in `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing `trust_remote_code=False` (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the `trust_remote_code` gate was implemented inside `DiffusionPipeline.download()` rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited `download()` also bypassed the security check:</p> <p>1. **Cross-repo `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the gate evaluated against `repoA`&#39;s file list rather than `repoB`&#39;s, so `repoB`&#39;s `pipeline.py` was loaded and executed. 2. **Local snapshot + Hub `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the local-path branch never invoked `download()`, so the gate was never reached and remote code from `repoB` executed. 3. **Local snapshot with custom components.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. `unet/my_unet_model.py`) referenced from `model_index.json` — same root cause; the local path skipped `download()` and custom component code executed.</p> <p>Silent remote code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Anyone calling `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretraine…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h9-4798-4q5v https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-40 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-40 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:60520 <p>urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows: argoproj/argo-workflows is vulnerable to RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted image buffer with zero-valued size field image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted ICNS image buffer mlflow/mlflow: mlflow/mlflow: Unauthenticated remote code execution via unprotected job endpoints mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file read via bypassed source path validation python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames nltk: NLTK: Information disclosure via path traversal vulnerability keras: Keras: Arbitrary code execution via deserialization vulnerability brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity shell-quo…</p> <p>urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows: argoproj/argo-workflows is vulnerable to RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted image buffer with zero-valued size field image-size: image-size: Denial of Service via crafted ICNS image buffer mlflow/mlflow: mlflow/mlflow: Unauthenticated remote code execution via unprotected job endpoints mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file read via bypassed source path validation python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames nltk: NLTK: Information disclosure via path traversal vulnerability keras: Keras: Arbitrary code execution via deserialization vulnerability brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity shell-quo…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:60520