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EUVD-2026-318470

fkie_cve-2026-44471

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.

GHSA-f89h-2fjh-2r9q — gix-fs: Symlink prefix-reuse allows worktree escape during checkout

Affected: crates.io: gix-fs

### Summary

A malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to.

### Details

During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared `gix_worktree::Stack`. Internally, this uses a `gix_fs::Stack`.

`gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current()` caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at `gix-fs/src/stack.rs:195-197` invokes only `delegate.push_directory()`, never `delegate.push()`.

In `gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate`, when the state member is `State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack`, `Attributes::push_directory()` only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk `symlink_metadata()` check and unlink-on-collision live in `StackDelegate::push()`'s invocation of `create_leading_directory()`, which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain `std::os::unix::fs::symlink`, which follows symlinks in parent directories.

Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. If a tree is constructed with:

1. A `120000` (symlink) entry `a` that points to `.git/hooks`. 2. A `040000` (directory) entry `a` wit…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44471

Affected: Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-gix-fs, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-gix-fs, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-gix-fs