https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 04:45:31 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07992 bdu:2026-07992 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07992 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309154 EUVD-2026-309154 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309154 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44338 <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 2.5.6 to before version 4.6.34, PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 2.5.6 to before version 4.6.34, PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44338 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.</p> <p>- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15). - `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18). - `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=&#34;agents.yaml&#34;).run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31). - `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[sr…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.</p> <p>- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15). - `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18). - `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=&#34;agents.yaml&#34;).run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31). - `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[sr…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2904 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai</p> <p>### Summary PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.</p> <p>- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15). - `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18). - `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=&#34;agents.yaml&#34;).run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31). - `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[sr…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai</p> <p>### Summary PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.</p> <p>### Details The vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.</p> <p>- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15). - `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18). - `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=&#34;agents.yaml&#34;).run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31). - `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[sr…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2904