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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:40:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309170</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309170</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309170</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309170</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44335</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44335</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.6.32, the URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.32.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.6.32, the URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.32.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44335</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g — PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q9pw-vmhh-384g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1290&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1145&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151256-24-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d5f16b74-5ad2-444f-8600-b05f78a4b769&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1143&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;740&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151437-24-2&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1bf6ec2-d32a-4dac-b814-da819e8d3c83&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1042&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;576&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151645-24-3&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e17352c3-4205-44d6-ab6e-75566480215b&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is a test code I wr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1290&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1145&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151256-24-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d5f16b74-5ad2-444f-8600-b05f78a4b769&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1143&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;740&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151437-24-2&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1bf6ec2-d32a-4dac-b814-da819e8d3c83&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1042&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;576&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151645-24-3&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e17352c3-4205-44d6-ab6e-75566480215b&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is a test code I wr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q9pw-vmhh-384g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2950 — PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2950</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1290&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1145&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151256-24-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d5f16b74-5ad2-444f-8600-b05f78a4b769&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1143&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;740&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151437-24-2&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1bf6ec2-d32a-4dac-b814-da819e8d3c83&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1042&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;576&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151645-24-3&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e17352c3-4205-44d6-ab6e-75566480215b&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is a test code I wr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1290&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;1145&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151256-24-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d5f16b74-5ad2-444f-8600-b05f78a4b769&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1143&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;740&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151437-24-2&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1bf6ec2-d32a-4dac-b814-da819e8d3c83&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1042&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;576&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;QQ20260424-151645-24-3&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e17352c3-4205-44d6-ab6e-75566480215b&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below is a test code I wr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2950</guid>
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