https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 02:25:19 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09645 bdu:2026-09645 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09645 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1067 certfr-2026-avi-1067 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1067 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bo52019 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: trino</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the trino package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: trino</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the trino package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-bo52019 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366772 EUVD-2026-366772 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366772 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44248 <p>Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.</p> <p>Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44248 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfg9-48mv-9qgx <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-mqtt</p> <p>### Impact The MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered _before_ any message size limit is applied.</p> <p>Specifically, in `MqttDecoder`, the `decodeVariableHeader()` method is called before the `bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage` check. The `decodeVariableHeader()` can call other methods which will call `decodeProperties()`. Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded.</p> <p>Additionally, because `MqttDecoder` extends `ReplayingDecoder`, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion.</p> <p>This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory.</p> <p>### Resources `ANT-2026-09608` https://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v5.0/os/mqtt-v5.0-os.html#_Toc3901027</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-mqtt</p> <p>### Impact The MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered _before_ any message size limit is applied.</p> <p>Specifically, in `MqttDecoder`, the `decodeVariableHeader()` method is called before the `bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage` check. The `decodeVariableHeader()` can call other methods which will call `decodeProperties()`. Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded.</p> <p>Additionally, because `MqttDecoder` extends `ReplayingDecoder`, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion.</p> <p>This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory.</p> <p>### Resources `ANT-2026-09608` https://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v5.0/os/mqtt-v5.0-os.html#_Toc3901027</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfg9-48mv-9qgx https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0258 NCSC-2026-0258 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0258 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10795-1 <p>netty-4.1.133-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>netty-4.1.133-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10795-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:37390 <p>assertj: AssertJ: Information disclosure and denial of service via XML External Entity (XXE) org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via CRLF sequences due to configuration attribute renames org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output causes denial of service in logging org.apache.logging.log4j: Apache Log4j JsonTemplateLayout: Denial of Service via invalid JSON output micrometer-core: micrometer-jetty11: micrometer-jetty12: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests netty: io.netty/netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation netty: Netty: High integrity impact due to improper DNS domain name constraint enforcement netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion netty-codec-redis: Netty: Command injection via CRLF characters in Redis codec encoder netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: io.netty/netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression netty: io.netty/netty-codec-mqtt: Netty: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption from crafted MQTT 5 header netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-redis: netty-codec-redis: Denial of Service via crafted Redis payl…</p> <p>assertj: AssertJ: Information disclosure and denial of service via XML External Entity (XXE) org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via CRLF sequences due to configuration attribute renames org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output causes denial of service in logging org.apache.logging.log4j: Apache Log4j JsonTemplateLayout: Denial of Service via invalid JSON output micrometer-core: micrometer-jetty11: micrometer-jetty12: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests netty: io.netty/netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation netty: Netty: High integrity impact due to improper DNS domain name constraint enforcement netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion netty-codec-redis: Netty: Command injection via CRLF characters in Redis codec encoder netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: io.netty/netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression netty: io.netty/netty-codec-mqtt: Netty: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption from crafted MQTT 5 header netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-redis: netty-codec-redis: Denial of Service via crafted Redis payl…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:37390 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44248 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty</p> <p>Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader &gt; maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44248 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1372 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1372