https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 13:49:09 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10828 bdu:2026-10828 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10828 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-44244 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python&#39;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\n` becomes `\n\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.</p> <p>The vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython&#39;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.</p> <p>This was found while auditing MLRun&#39;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.</p> <p>PoC (standalone, no MLRun required):</p> <p>```python import git, subprocess, os</p> <p>repo = git.Repo(&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;)</p> <p>with repo.config_writer() as cw: cw.set_value(&#34;user&#34;, &#34;name&#34;, &#34;foo\n[core]\nhooksPath=/tmp/hooks&#34;)</p> <p>r = subprocess.run([&#34;git&#34;, &#34;config&#34;, &#34;core.hooksPath&#34;], cwd=&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;, capture_output=True, text=True) assert r.returncode == 0 print(r.stdout.strip()) # /tmp/hooks</p> <p>os.makedirs(&#34;/tmp/hooks&#34;, exist_ok=True) open(&#34;/tmp/hooks/pre-commit&#34;,…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python&#39;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\n` becomes `\n\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.</p> <p>The vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython&#39;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.</p> <p>This was found while auditing MLRun&#39;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.</p> <p>PoC (standalone, no MLRun required):</p> <p>```python import git, subprocess, os</p> <p>repo = git.Repo(&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;)</p> <p>with repo.config_writer() as cw: cw.set_value(&#34;user&#34;, &#34;name&#34;, &#34;foo\n[core]\nhooksPath=/tmp/hooks&#34;)</p> <p>r = subprocess.run([&#34;git&#34;, &#34;config&#34;, &#34;core.hooksPath&#34;], cwd=&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;, capture_output=True, text=True) assert r.returncode == 0 print(r.stdout.strip()) # /tmp/hooks</p> <p>os.makedirs(&#34;/tmp/hooks&#34;, exist_ok=True) open(&#34;/tmp/hooks/pre-commit&#34;,…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-44244 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1056 certfr-2026-avi-1056 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1056 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309310 EUVD-2026-309310 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309310 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44244 <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44244 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v87r-6q3f-2j67 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python&#39;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\n` becomes `\n\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.</p> <p>The vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython&#39;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.</p> <p>This was found while auditing MLRun&#39;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.</p> <p>PoC (standalone, no MLRun required):</p> <p>```python import git, subprocess, os</p> <p>repo = git.Repo(&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;)</p> <p>with repo.config_writer() as cw: cw.set_value(&#34;user&#34;, &#34;name&#34;, &#34;foo\n[core]\nhooksPath=/tmp/hooks&#34;)</p> <p>r = subprocess.run([&#34;git&#34;, &#34;config&#34;, &#34;core.hooksPath&#34;], cwd=&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;, capture_output=True, text=True) assert r.returncode == 0 print(r.stdout.strip()) # /tmp/hooks</p> <p>os.makedirs(&#34;/tmp/hooks&#34;, exist_ok=True) open(&#34;/tmp/hooks/pre-commit&#34;,…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python&#39;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\n` becomes `\n\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.</p> <p>The vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython&#39;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.</p> <p>This was found while auditing MLRun&#39;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.</p> <p>PoC (standalone, no MLRun required):</p> <p>```python import git, subprocess, os</p> <p>repo = git.Repo(&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;)</p> <p>with repo.config_writer() as cw: cw.set_value(&#34;user&#34;, &#34;name&#34;, &#34;foo\n[core]\nhooksPath=/tmp/hooks&#34;)</p> <p>r = subprocess.run([&#34;git&#34;, &#34;config&#34;, &#34;core.hooksPath&#34;], cwd=&#34;/tmp/testrepo&#34;, capture_output=True, text=True) assert r.returncode == 0 print(r.stdout.strip()) # /tmp/hooks</p> <p>os.makedirs(&#34;/tmp/hooks&#34;, exist_ok=True) open(&#34;/tmp/hooks/pre-commit&#34;,…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v87r-6q3f-2j67 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-2306 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>### Summary GitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.</p> <p>### Details GitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:</p> <p>- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe. - `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.</p> <p>The vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they&amp;apos;re its normalized into command-line flags:</p> <p>- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390` - `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071` - `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125` - `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`</p> <p>That validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>### Summary GitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.</p> <p>### Details GitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:</p> <p>- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe. - `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.</p> <p>The vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they&amp;apos;re its normalized into command-line flags:</p> <p>- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390` - `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071` - `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125` - `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`</p> <p>That validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-2306 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10758-1 <p>python311-GitPython-3.1.49-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>python311-GitPython-3.1.49-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10758-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2163 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2163 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:42078 <p>lodash: lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution aap-gateway: missing requestHeadersToRemove allows mTLS bypass via Subject header spoofing pulpcore: pulpcore: relative_path_validator bypass via directory traversal in FilesystemExport golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Denial of Service via inefficient certificate chain validation net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing axios: Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration…</p> <p>lodash: lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution aap-gateway: missing requestHeadersToRemove allows mTLS bypass via Subject header spoofing pulpcore: pulpcore: relative_path_validator bypass via directory traversal in FilesystemExport golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Denial of Service via inefficient certificate chain validation net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing axios: Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:42078 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:21813-1 <p>Security update for python-GitPython</p> <p>Security update for python-GitPython</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:21813-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44244 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:25.10: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:25.10: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.49, GitConfigParser.set_value() passes values to Python&#39;s configparser without validating for newlines. GitPython&#39;s own _write() converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. \n becomes \n\t), but Git still accepts an indented [core] stanza as a section header — so the injected core.hooksPath becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.49.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44244 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2933 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Splunk SOAR ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Splunk SOAR ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2933