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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:39:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-335170</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335170</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-335170</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335170</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44040</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44040</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44040</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-j37g-g7hg-vhg6</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j37g-g7hg-vhg6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j37g-g7hg-vhg6</guid>
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      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2162 — UltraVNC: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2162</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in UltraVNC ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, Daten zu manipulieren, und einen Denial of Service zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in UltraVNC ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, Daten zu manipulieren, und einen Denial of Service zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2162</guid>
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