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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:47:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-09273</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09273</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-09273</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09273</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322630</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322630</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322630</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322630</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43898</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43898</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.9.6, sandbox-defined functions expose Function.caller, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal LispType.Call runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.9.6, sandbox-defined functions expose Function.caller, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal LispType.Call runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43898</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g8f2-4f4f-5jqw — SandboxJS has a sandbox escape via Function.caller leakage of internal call op</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g8f2-4f4f-5jqw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nyariv/sandboxjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Sandbox-defined functions expose `Function.caller`, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal `LispType.Call` runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript.
### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in the property access logic registered via `addOps` in [prop.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/prop.ts#L10). Sandboxed code could access the `caller`, `callee`, and `arguments` properties on functions. In the CommonJS build, this allowed sandboxed code to read `Function.caller` and leak a privileged internal `LispType.Call` callback.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In [executorUtils.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/executorUtils.ts#L239-L282) `createFunction()` constructs normal host JS functions, and because these are ordinary host functions, sandbox code can observe:
```js
function f(){ return f.caller }
```
That leaks the host-side callback that invoked the sandbox function. This leaked callback is the internal `LispType.Call` op, which is registered in [call.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L16-L17). The escape was possible because the `LispType.Call` handler accepts a **params** object from the attacker and uses it…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nyariv/sandboxjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Sandbox-defined functions expose `Function.caller`, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal `LispType.Call` runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript.
### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is in the property access logic registered via `addOps` in [prop.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/prop.ts#L10). Sandboxed code could access the `caller`, `callee`, and `arguments` properties on functions. In the CommonJS build, this allowed sandboxed code to read `Function.caller` and leak a privileged internal `LispType.Call` callback.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In [executorUtils.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/executorUtils.ts#L239-L282) `createFunction()` constructs normal host JS functions, and because these are ordinary host functions, sandbox code can observe:
```js
function f(){ return f.caller }
```
That leaks the host-side callback that invoked the sandbox function. This leaked callback is the internal `LispType.Call` op, which is registered in [call.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L16-L17). The escape was possible because the `LispType.Call` handler accepts a **params** object from the attacker and uses it…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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